contributions to the new era by bringing the East Asian perspectives together with these actors and in a way that reflects Japan's dual experiences as latecomer and donor.
There are several reasons for my argument. First, over the past two and half decades, Japan has made strenuous efforts to build the Official Development Assistance (ODA) institutional framework-initially to make the ODA system commensurate with leading donor (in the 1990s) and later to improve the operational efficiency and transparency Second, the growth agenda has returned to the center of global development debates, after a decade of the poverty reduction drive that dominated the late 1990s to the early 2000s. Japan's aid policy strongly reflects its own historical experience as a successful latecomer country. Japan has long assisted developing countries in attaining self-reliance, sustaining growth and overcoming aid dependency. Successful East Asian economies have adopted growth-oriented development strategies of one kind or another. Many of these economies are now graduating from aid and becoming important players of South-South cooperation. For Japan and other like-minded East Asian donors, regained global balance between growth and poverty reduction, with more emphasis on the former, is highly welcome.
Together with emerging donors and through enhanced partnership with private actors, Japan should actively share the East Asian perspectives of aid and development with interested countries (including policymakers and practitioners, researchers and private sector) by supporting their country-specific growth strategy formulation and implementation. Based on the institutional foundations that have been built in the recent decades, Japan should embark on the new era of development cooperation and play a proactive global role. This paper is organized as follows. The first section will review the external and domestic environment that has affected Japan's ODA since the 1990s, namely after the Cold War, and the second section will discuss policy and institutional reforms that took place in this period of two and half decades. The final section will outline key elements of the East Asian approach to development and aid and suggest unique contributions that Japan can make in the new era of development cooperation. Specific reference will be made to the ongoing Japan-Ethiopia industrial policy dialogue, jointly supported by JICA and the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS). This is a pioneer example of the endeavor to transfer the East Asian development approach to Africa, in which the author has participated as part of the project team for the last four years.
The External and Domestic Environment Affecting Japan's Development Cooperation
The post-Cold War era has seen significant changes in the environment surrounding international development. With the acceleration of globalization, the development agenda has expanded to include global issues that extend beyond national borders such as climate change, infectious diseases and financial crises. The easing of East-West tensions has caused civil wars and regional conflicts, and the synchronized terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) further raised the importance of supporting fragile states and peace-building to carry on with "the fight against terrorism" in alliance with the United States (US). The aid fatigue syndrome that prevailed during the post-Cold War era forced donor countries and institutions to take concerted actions to elevate "poverty reduction" to the highest international development goal in order to regain Domestically, the positioning of Japan's ODA in the national policy has changed significantly. Until the early 1990s, ODA enjoyed strong political support in Japan, receiving a significant increase of annual budget allocation (See Box). As a result, by the beginning of the 1990s when the Cold War ended, Japan had become the world's largest donor in aid volume, surpassing the US. To assume global responsibility commensurate with its role as top donor, Japan made enormous efforts to contribute to international development by diversifying its priority regions and countries of ODA allocation beyond Asia, and by making active engagement in post-conflict nation building, global issues, and African development. The participation of the Peacekeeping It was unfortunate for Japan that this outward-looking period did not last for long.
Following the bubble burst and the prolonged economic recession, the government was forced to take austerity measures, and the ODA budget was the item most severely hit. Japan's ODA budget, once regarded as sacred, has declined over the past 14 years with a cumulative reduction of 48 percent in FY2013 from the peak level in FY1997. As a result, on a net disbursement basis, the US replaced Japan as top donor in 2001 for the first time since 1991. Continuing its downward trend, Japan has been ranked fifth after the US, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), and France since 2007 2)
.
Faced with fiscal austerity, the government and aid agencies were forced to strategically prioritize ODA spending in order to maintain aid effectiveness and respond to diversified global needs within the limited budget.
Yet, it is notable that the first decade of the 21 st century was the period when a series of ODA reforms were implemented in Japan. These include the revision of ODA Charter Also, such reforms were considered necessary for Japan to be able to participate effectively in aid partnership at the country-level, which was strongly demanded by the international aid community at that time.
2) Nevertheless, the government has maintained the size of ODA operations to meet the vast development needs of countries in Asia and other regions by actively mobilizing ODA loans. On a gross disbursement basis, Japan remains the second-largest donor among the OECD/DAC member countries.
3) JBIC was established in 1999, through the merger of the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) and the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank of Japan, as part of public financial sector reform. But, within ten years, again for the same reason, the OECF was separated from JBIC and merged with JICA. Note: A bar chart indicating the volume of Japan's ODA in net disbursements, indicated in US dollars.
Source: Elaborated by the author, based on the information from the MOFA and the MOF.
In the second decade of the 2000s, Japan faces further complex challenges. In March 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake disaster hit the Pacific coast of the Tohoku region, causing enormous loss in human lives and property. In the coming years, the government must set aside a significant amount of the national budget to achieve early recovery and reconstruction in the disaster-struck region; therefore, fiscal austerity will continue. At the same time, the earthquake has provided an opportunity for Japanese citizens to appreciate the international cooperation offered from various countries, organizations, and individuals, and it has reminded us of the importance of inter-dependence and mutual help. The disaster was so devastating and painful that the whole nation united to support recovery and reconstruction of the Tohoku region.
Alliances between businesses, NGOs and local communities were forged, and innovative activities are emerging, such as social business and social investment, to support the affected areas and people. Moreover, the Great East Japan Earthquake disrupted the global supply chain of manufacturing industries because of damage to factories in the In the two and half decades of the 1990s through the early 2000s, a series of ODA reforms were carried out, driven by both external and domestic pressures, and the foundation of the present ODA policy and institutional framework were established.
Improving the ODA system and making a global commitment as top donor (1990s)
During the first half of the 1990s, Japan made explicit efforts to improve its ODA policy
and institutional framework, to be commensurate with its position as top donor. On the policy framework, the government formulated the first ODA Charter in 1992
(approved by the Cabinet), and consecutively the Medium-Term Policy on ODA in 1999.
These documents articulate the philosophy, principles and priority issues of Japan's ODA, as well as the approach and measures to ensure the efficient and effective implementation of assistance. The ODA Charter regards the support for self-help efforts of developing countries toward economic take-off as one of four principles, together with humanitarian assistance, inter-dependence, and environmental conservation (GoJ, 1992) . Notably, the Medium-Term ODA Policy gives special consideration to South-South and triangular cooperation as an effective way to facilitate the transfer of technologies between countries at similar stages of development (MOFA, 1999) .
Given that this type of cooperation has recently been attracting attention among development actors, it should be stressed that Japan has long been at the forefront of such endeavors.
In the 1990s, Japan diversified the priority regions and countries and expanded the scope of assistance to respond to the evolving needs of the international community and to assume greater global responsibility as top donor (see Figure 1 ). The Persian Gulf War of 1991, waged by US-led UN-authorized multinational forces in response to
Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait, became a particularly major turning point.
The Japanese government at that time made a pledge to contribute US$13 billion to the cost of the war, but because the government took time to reach that decision, the assistance was not necessarily highly evaluated by the international community. The
Gulf War experience was a big shock to the government and many Japanese citizens.
Subsequently Japan made a policy shift to participate more actively in the tasks of preserving global peace and security, not only by providing financial support but also by contributing personnel. This has led to the establishment of the Law Concerning
Cooperation for United Nations Peace Keeping Operations and Other Operations (PKO Law) and the start of dispatching of Self-Defense Forces personnel on PKO in 1992.
The first TICAD, held in October 1993 (in Tokyo), was Japan's major global initiative to promote high-level policy dialogue between African leaders and development partners. At this time, Western donors were losing interest in African development due to the aid fatigue that prevailed after the end of the Cold War. Since then, TICAD has been held at five-year intervals and become a major global framework to facilitate the implementation of initiatives for promoting African development under the dual principle of African "ownership" and international "partnership" 4) . Accordingly, regional and sectoral allocations of Japan's bilateral ODA have changed over time.
Although Asia and economic infrastructure continue to enjoy high priority in Japan's aid, the shares of Africa and the Middle East regions have increased during the past 20 to 30 years (see Figure 2) . Similarly, the share and the amount spent on social infrastructure services and humanitarian support have increased. The new ODA Charter (revised in 2003) defines the objective of Japan's ODA as "to contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan's own security and prosperity." To this end, the charter establishes five basic policies: (i) supporting self-help efforts of developing countries;
(ii) incorporating "human security" perspectives; (iii) assurance of fairness, giving consideration to vulnerable groups; (iv) utilizing Japan's experience and expertise; and
(v) partnership and collaboration with the international community (GoJ, 2003) . The
Medium-Term Policy on ODA (revised in 2005) further elaborates the concept of "human security" and states that Japan will address the four priority issues of "poverty reduction," "sustainable growth," "addressing global issues" and "peace-building" Many of the suggested measures in the third point above were implemented by the government and JICA, such as strengthening cooperation with NGOs and private business, reforming aid schemes (e.g., as the introduction of ODA loans in foreign currency, JICA's PSIF), increasing the independence of the ODA evaluation office within the MOFA, improving the information disclosure on ODA projects, and so on.
However, the revision of the ODA Charter has not been followed up. In the subsequent years of the DPJ administration, national debates tended to narrowly focus on administrative and domestic affairs rather than on Japan's future vision in an increasingly connected world. A typical example is the budget screening and transparency campaign (jigyou shiwake) launched in November 2009, under which the ODA budget was put under severe public scrutiny.
In late December 2012, the LDP regained control of the government by winning a clear majority in the national election. Under the LDP administration led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the government increasingly regards ODA as one of Japan's key diplomatic tools. The MOFA's priority policy issues for international cooperation for FY2013 state that ODA is to be utilized strategically and effectively under three major objectives:
(i) to realize a prosperous, free and stable international community; (ii) to support the growth of emerging and developing economies together with the growth of the Japanese economy; and (iii) to promote human security and strengthen trust in Japan 10)
. Although these elements were already noticeable to some extent under the previous administration, it appears that (i) and (ii) are being pushed more forcefully. Emphasis is placed on enhancing the quality and impact of ODA through improving partnerships with diverse players outside the government and the JICA, such as NGOs, small-and medium-enterprises (SMEs) and other private companies, local governments and universities, by involving their advanced technologies and know-how in overall ODA activities. Since around 2011, the MOFA and the JICA have introduced new cooperation modalities to promote public-private partnerships (PPP) such as preparatory surveys for PPP infrastructure projects and Base of the Pyramid (BOP) business 11) , PSIF, and more recently, those to promote partnerships with Japanese SMEs interested in contributing to the socio-economic development of developing countries, utilizing their technologies. If effectively implemented, such cooperation modalities can be useful for Japan to build continued partnerships with middle-income countries to address their socio-economic challenges, even after they have graduated from aid. Also, regarding (iii), Japan wishes to contribute to the solution of common global issues -in particular, disaster prevention and management-by sharing with the international community its accumulated experiences and knowledge of overcoming natural disasters.
Although Japan has long been actively helping disaster-stricken countries, the 10) See MOFA's homepage on Japan's ODA http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/oda_policy/pdfs/priority_policy_13.pdf 11) BOP businesses, often called "inclusive business," is a private-sector approach to providing goods, services, and livelihoods on a commercially viable basis to people at the base of the pyramid by making them part of the value chain of companies' core business as suppliers, distributors, retailers, or customers. government and citizens feel strongly that it should assume unique global responsibility for sharing its own experiences and knowledge obtained from the reconstruction process of the Great East Japan Earthquake ODA Charter. I believe that the time is ripe for the MOFA to initiate discussions on this matter, given the significant changes in the external and domestic environment of Japan's ODA over the last ten years. There is a need for Japan to reaffirm its rationale for and commitment to international development and get ready to make its unique contributions to the new era of development cooperation.
Toward a New Era of Development Cooperation: The Role
of Japan in Supporting Country-Specific Growth Strategies,
Based on East Asian Perspectives 14)
As discussed in the previous sections, Japan has advanced a series of ODA reforms over the past years, and global development debates are now shifting toward sustainable and inclusive growth, with deeper partnerships with the business sector. Japan should take this opportunity to make unique contributions to shaping international development policy for the new era. It should bring East Asian perspectives together with new actors in a way that reflects Japan's dual experiences as latecomer and donor. Regarding partnership with emerging donors, Japan has been at the forefront of South-South and triangular cooperation even before the 21 st century.
The following section will outline what I believe to be key elements of Japan's unique contributions, particularly in the area of supporting country-specific growth strategies. Japan's development and aid visions and its growth support approach will be discussed, with specific reference to the ongoing Japan-Ethiopia industrial policy dialogue jointly supported by JICA and GRIPS. Japan's development and aid visions: How do they differ from the Western approach?
Japan's development and aid visions strongly reflect its dual experience as a latecomer and a donor. First, Japan is the only non-Western country with an early history of successful industrialization. Ever since Japan opened its doors to the world in the second half of the nineteenth century, the desire to catch up with the advanced nations in the West has been a strong driving force leading to its economic achievements today.
Second, the generation of Japanese who lived through it vividly remembers the destruction and poverty the nation sustained following its defeat in World War II. This West and evaluate and rank developing countries by these criteria. While Growth Diagnostics devised by Harvard professors (Hausmann, Rodrik, & Velasco, 2005 ) is a major departure from the long and universal policy menu of the Washington
Consensus by focusing on a few binding constraints to growth, its logic tree tries to identify weaknesses of developing countries in terms of international standards and tries to remove them with limited attention to political feasibility.
As discussed below, the East Asian approach is characterized by real-sector pragmatism, goal orientation, and the pursuit of unique strengths of a particular country. The problem of weak policy capability is overcome through focused hands-on endeavors to achieve concrete objectives, rather than trying to improve governance scores generally vis-à-vis the global standard with no specific goals. We call this approach "dynamic capacity development" (Ohno 2013 , Ohno & Ohno 2012 . Dynamic capacity development aims at improving policy capability through acquiring knowledge and skills by solving specific problems while working toward achieving concrete goals.
This approach should help developing countries gain confidence by step by step.
Real-sector pragmatism
Yanagihara (1998) distinguishes the "framework approach" practiced by Western aid donors and the "ingredients approach" adopted by the Japanese government in its development aid strategy. The framework approach emphasizes the rules of the game according to which the private sector acts and policy makers make decisions while leaving the actual outcome of the game to individual matches and players. In this approach, the functioning of markets, the principle of official intervention, budget and public investment frameworks, empowerment and participation, monitoring mechanisms, Similarly, the technical specification of roads and bridges to be built, the lot size and administrative supports in an industrial zone, and other details which are normally left to consultants and contractors are the proper concern of Japanese aid officials.
Goal orientation
In high performing economies in East Asia, industrial policy has usually taken a goal-targeting form: The top government leader proclaims a long-term national vision that shows a direction without specifying details. To realize this vision, appropriate government organizations are created or designated to draft ambitious but feasible strategies and execute concrete action plans. Strategies and action plans may be revised as circumstances change, but the long-term vision remains intact. Working backwards from broad goals to phased strategies and concrete action plans, while making necessary adjustments and accumulating experience and confidence along the way, has been the hallmark of East Asian development planning. 
Enhancing unique strengths rather than removing general negatives
Instead of comparing countries across the board to rank them or find faults with individual countries relative to the global norm, the East Asian approach is to identify the future potential (dynamic comparative advantage) unique to each country. Limited resources are poured into this area to realize that potential rather than scattered across many unrelated programs. The development strategy of a land-locked country with rich mineral resources should be entirely different from that of a country with long coastal lines and excellent seaports. Unique potential for each country should be identified, and main policy efforts must be directed toward removing barriers to attain that potential.
Consequently, in providing development assistance, Japanese experts pay attention to the strengths of a country and consider how to make full use of the country's economic potential. Particular bottlenecks are identified in this light (such as infrastructure, human resources, technology, specific institutional capacity), and goals and targets are set to remove the bottlenecks. Concrete targets, such as construction of a trunk road from A to B or promotion of certain industry by a certain deadline, are preferred over general improvements in governance or private sector capability. Then plans and actions are created backwards, thinking from the future to the present, to attain certain goals and targets. This is in sharp contrast to the call for wide-ranging reforms without specific real-sector targets such as those of IMF conditionalities, World Bank policy matrices, good governance drive, and other institutional reform agenda.
Comprehensive policy dialogue as an entry point for country-specific growth support Then, how should the East Asian approach be practiced in a latecomer country, for example, an African country? We believe that policy dialogue, which Japan has conducted routinely in East Asia, can be a valid instrument for supporting African growth. Since the East Asian approach rejects the idea of common answers, it cannot deliver a pre-determined solution applicable to all countries. The lessons must be learned interactively. What this approach can offer is a suggestion for methodologythe way a solution should be constructed for each country.
Policy dialogue is intellectual cooperation between a developing country and an advanced one, held regularly over several years with an open and evolving agenda.
There is no pre-determined formula for cooperation, and responsiveness to clients' needs and "think-together" approach drive the dialogue process. Policy dialogue differs from technical assistance with narrowly prescribed terms of reference or with a standardized policy matrix. It is also unlike seminars and tours organized by an industrialized country to publicize its past achievements. Japan's policy dialogue cites concrete cases from all around the world-not just Japanese experiences, which are usually too advanced for many developing countries. If strong ownership and commitment exist on the side of the partner countries, they should serve as a useful instrument for helping improving their policy capability through hands-on advice.
Starting with Argentina, Japan has conducted policy dialogue with many developing countries in various modalities regarding purpose, scale, participants, duration, and frequency (see Table 1 ). It usually starts with a national leader of a developing country requesting that Japan discuss general development strategy or teach and transfer the experiences of East Asian development. In countries such as Vietnam, Indonesia and Laos, the Japanese government has mobilized a large number of academics, businesses, and aid consultants to identify key issues, study them, and offer policy advice. A similar policy dialogue is about to start in Myanmar. 
JICA's industrial support projects
Note: Black squares indicate policy dialogue sessions in Addis Ababa with the prime minister, concerned ministers and state ministers, and officials and experts at operational levels.
Next: Jan. 2014
Source: Elaborated by the author.
In the second-phase industrial policy dialogue, we have so far discussed such topics as strategic approaches to export promotion and FDI attraction, as well as technology transfer by promoting local and foreign business linkages. These are essential elements of the effective implementation of the five-year development plan (GTP) and have been strongly requested by the Ethiopian senior policymakers for learning the practices of the East Asian countries. A distinctive feature of the second-phase activity is that the dialogue process is combined with South-South and triangular cooperation in 
Conclusion
Over the past decade, a number of emerging economies have become important players in South-South cooperation, and private actors are increasingly engaged in businesses that have important impacts on development. The second decade of the 21 st century is a critical period for establishing global partnerships for effective development cooperation (OECD/DAC, 2011) and shaping the post-MDG framework for development in an inclusive manner with the broader development actors. Japan has been practicing South-South and triangular cooperation even before the 21 st century. Moreover, close linkages among aid, trade and investment have been a key feature of Japan's ODA and development cooperation. In this context, Japan's approach to supporting country-specific growth strategies, with the East Asian perspectives of real-sector pragmatism and goal orientation based on unique strengths, can be useful complements to the Western approach. Such an approach should "offer a wider set of options from which developing countries can choose and combine" (Menocal & Denny, 2011) .
There are good opportunities for Japan, with its distinctive strengths, to add value to
